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BOOK REVIEWS
H.L.A. HART. Neil MacCormick. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1981. Pp. 184. $18.50 (cloth).
It is fitting that this first book in a series "devoted to eminent jurists
and legal thinkers" should examine the work of Herbert Hart, whose
contributions to legal philosophy revitalized the subject and inspired
many others to investigate the moral problems as well as the analytical
puzzles generated by law. Neil MacCormick's study sensibly concen-
trates on Hart's work in analytical jurisprudence, especially The Concept
of Law, for that is the focal point of Hart's most systematic theories.
Since its publication in 1961, The Concept of Law has been a benchmark
for legal philosophy, a foundation for further progress in the field.
MacCormick presents Hart's legal theory thoroughly and fairly.
He discusses Hart's philosophical orientation, traces connections be-
tween Hart's theory of law and his moral views, and integrates what
might seem disparate aspects of Hart's work.
MacCormick is a sympathetic interpreter and critic. He identifies
difficulties and oversimplifications and proposes reasonable refinements,
but endorses both Hart's general approach and the main lines of his
theories. Because of the continuing importance of MacCormick's sub-
ject, this review emphasizes some questions about central themes within
Hart's work that MacCormick overlooks. These include the adequacy
of Hart's analysis of law as "the union of primary and secondary rules,"
his theory of legal obligation, and his conception of morality.
I
THE NATURE OF LAW
Classical positivism-the theory developed by Bentham and Aus-
tin-conceives of law in terms of coercive relations between those who
make its rules and those subjected to them. This "imperative theory"
construes the elements of a body of law as "orders backed by threats."'
Such rules belong to law only when they can be traced to the political
"sovereign" of a community-a person or group of persons whose coer-
cive commands are generally observed by the members of the commu-
nity and who are not similarly subordinate to anyone else.
Hart derives the outlines of a much more complex and promising
analysis from a persuasive critique of classical positivism. While the im-
perative theory offers an initially plausible model for legal restrictions, it
obscures those elements of law that facilitate changes in legal relations.
1 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 16, 19 (1961).
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Law contains not only "primary" or "obligation-imposing" rules, but
also contains "secondary" rules, including those that confer legal powers
and make possible legal arrangements by private individuals.2 Secon-
dary rules underlie official positions and are also presupposed by the
indentification of laws within a system, providing the basis for authori-
tative rule-change and rule-application. 3 Additionally, the notion of a
primary rule and the obligations that it imposes cannot be understood
on the model of orders backed by threats. Rules and obligations involve
complex social practices and internalized standards for behavior. 4
In place of the imperative theory, Hart characterizes law as "the
union of primary and secondary rules" along the following lines:
There are therefore two minimum conditions necessary and suffi-
cient for the existence of a legal system. On the one hand those rules
of behaviour which are valid according to the system's ultimate crite-
ria of validity must be generally obeyed, and, on the other hand, its
rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules
of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common
public standards of official behaviour by its officials. 5
MacCormick accepts this general framework, and much of his book
is devoted to developing it further. He, for example, clarifies Hart's
sometimes obscure notion of the "internal point of view" that is essential
to the existence of social rules.6 He distinguishes and refines Hart's no-
tions of "secondary" and "power-conferring" rules. 7 He explains how
Hart exaggerates the role of rules as distinct from other, often more fun-
damental, normative standards,8 and how Hart overextends the concept
of obligation.9 He relates Hart's analysis of law to his theories of punish-
ment and the minimal content of natural law.10 He examines Hart's
theory of adjudication, including his views about the "open texture" of
legal rules and judicial "discretion."'I
The last topic mentioned is one to which MacCormick has made a
substantial contribution, 12 and it has become a focal point of contro-
versy within legal philosophy. The subject, however, is complex, and
MacCormick's treatment of it does not do justice either to his own views
or to those of Ronald Dworkin,13 Hart's most prominent critic. I shall
2 See id. at 26-48.
3 See id. at 49-114.
4 See id. at 54-58, 79-88.
5 Id. at 113.
6 N. MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 30-44 (1981).
7 See id. at 103-6, 76-85.
8 See id. at 50-54.
9 See id. at 58-61
10 See id. at 135-37.
11 See id. at 121-33.
12 See generaly N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978).
13 See genera/ly R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
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concentrate here on problems that have received less attention in the
literature and that should trouble anyone sympathetic to Hart's basic
concerns.
Hart's conception of law is puzzling for more than one reason. Ac-
cording to his theory, what counts as law depends on what officials ac-
cept as the fundamental tests for law; but the authority of officials to
make such determinations rests in turn upon laws that create and regu-
late official positions-laws whose existence ultimately depends on their
satisfaction of whatever criteria the officials accept. This is circular. Of-
ficials decide what rules exist, including the rules by virtue of which they
have official status. How is this possible?
MacCormick is sensitive to the apparent paradox, and his interest-
ing discussion of related problems' 4 suggests how it might be dispelled.
Hart's theory describes the structure of legal institutions once they have
been established, but it does not pretend to explain how such a complex
social arrangement comes about. Hart does not claim, for example, that
the historical processes that result in full-blown legal systems are them-
selves regulated by law. To this we may add that those who aspire to
occupy official positions cannot secure them just by mutual agreement,
for they cannot wish law into existence. Rather, a legal system requires
more than the complex internal structure described by Hart; it does not
exist unless the behavioral guidelines laid down by law are generally
complied with by the members of a community.
Hart's theory is puzzling for other reasons as well. He gives us rea-
son to believe that his statement of minimal "necessary and sufficient"
conditions for the existence of a legal system may be misleading. First,
he claims that we cannot assume that all the instances of a general term
like "law" share common characteristics. Like the standard examples of
games and Hart's own example of rules, legal systems might be related
not by sharing essential properties but rather by "family resem-
blances."' 5 Hart further suggests that the concepts of law and a legal
system are, like other concepts he discusses, "open textured" and some-
what vague; while some things are clearly law and others clearly not,
still other things may lie within the "penumbra" of such concepts, re-
taining some of the salient characteristics of law but lacking others or
possessing unusual properties.' 6 Hart suggests, for example, that legal
systems need not systematically enforce primary rules.' 7 Hart does seem
to hold, however, that he has identified the defining features of clear,
central cases of law. Along with his use of the expression "necessary and
sufficient conditions," he implies that law can be distinguished from
14 See N. MACCORMICK, supra note 6, at 110-20.
15 See H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 15-16, 79.
16 See id. at 79, 96, 119-32.
17 See id. at 95.
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other social phenomena by reference to "the union of primary and sec-
ondary rules."
Allowing for some looseness in the concept of law, we may ask
whether Hart's analysis achieves this end. The most sympathetic ap-
praisal of Hart's theory should generate the following query. Let us sup-
pose that whenever there is a clear case of a legal system there must be a
union of primary and secondary rules as described. Does this enable us
to distinguish law from other things? If not, then even if Hart's theory
states conditions that are "necessary" for the existence of a legal system,
it fails to supply conditions that are "sufficient." Those conditions
might be satisfied and we might still fail to have law. Alternatively,
Hart's analysis might fail to distinguish law from social arrangements
that coexist with it but that are not law, and perhaps also are not bor-
derline cases. That seems to be the case.
To test Hart's theory, we must consider his analysis abstractly. We
must ask whether there are or can be forms of social organization that
are not legal systems but have the following properties: they contain
rules of behavior whose existence depends on criteria supplied by other
rules, as well as rules creating and regulating positions, which confer
competence to change, apply, and identify rules within the organiza-
tion, where the rules are generally complied with by those to whom they
apply. Once we pose the question this way, we see that such a structure
is not peculiar to legal systems, but is characteristic of many social orga-
nizations, ranging from private clubs to religious institutions.
This problem cannot be evaded by resolving to apply the term
"law" to all those institutions that share such a structure with legal sys-
tems. For that either begs the question or acknowledges the failure of
the theoretical undertaking to distinguish law from other things. The
problem is not easily solved. The obvious way of trying to rectify Hart's
analysis is to identify further distinguishing characteristics of legal sys-
tems. Yet reflection on possible ways of supplementing Hart's analysis
will show that the task is not easily accomplished, if it can be done at all.
Despite Hart's skepticism on this matter, one might try, for exam-
pie, to distinguish law by reference to coercive sanctions. But coercive
sanctions can be and have been employed systematically outside the law
in other institutions, with and without legal permission. In view of this
fact, the proposal might take the familiar form of holding that law (or
its counterpart, the political state) enjoys a "monopoly" on the use of
force. But in the present context this must be interpreted as the notion
that law claims the exclusive or ultimate Yight to regulate the use of force
within a population, and nothing prevents other organizations from
claiming such a right for themselves.
In other words, when considering possible differences between law
and other social organizations, we must be careful to understand them
260 [Vol. 68:257
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in analogous terms. If we approach the matter by conceiving of, for
instance, the scope, relative authority, or "legitimacy" of the law through
the eyes of the law, then when considering other social organizations, we
must likewise think of the scope, relative authority, or "legitimacy" of
the rules of those other institutionsfrom their respective standpoints. Just as
those to whom the legal rules apply are determined by the law itself,
those to whom the rules of another institution apply are determined by
the rules of that institution. While law may be accorded ultimate au-
thority when one adopts the standpoint of the law, the rules of another
institution (such as a church) may likewise be credited with ultimate
authority when one adopts the standpoint of that institution.
These comments suggest the contours of a large, unexplored diffi-
culty for Hart's theory. His analysis is profoundly incomplete unless it
distinguishes law from other forms of social organization. If this prob-
lem cannot be solved by supplementing Hart's analysis, it may signify
that Hart's approach has reached a dead end and that law requires the-
oretical analysis of a different type.
It is unfortunate that MacCormick fails to consider problems of this
magnitude. He does not seem seriously to entertain the possibility that
Hart's theory might be deficient, other than in matters of detail.
II
LEGAL OBLIGATION
One of the central concepts in both law and morals is obligation,
and Hart devotes considerable attention to it. This is partly because, as
MacCormick notes,18 Hart in The Concept of Law employs the notion in a
wide, generic sense: Hart treats all legal and moral requirements as
"obligations."
In place of obligation, MacCormick suggests that the generic no-
tion involved in appraising conduct is that of a "requirement"--a stan-
dard of minimally acceptable behavior-and its breach, wrongdoing.19
This is plausible. For present purposes, however, the distinctions traced
by MacCormick can be ignored. They have no effect on the problems
now to be discussed.
Despite his reservations about Hart's theory, MacCormick claims
that Hart's most important contribution to legal philosophy is his appli-
cation to it of the "hermeneutic approach," 20 which enables Hart to
recognize that appraisals of conduct imply beliefs that are naturally ex-
pressed in normative language. This amounts to the rejection of crude
"behavioristic" interpretations of moral and legal judgments, which do
not merely refer to patterns of "external" behavior or, for that matter, to
18 See N. MAcCORtMIcK, supra note 6, at 58-59 (also noting that Hart draws relevant
distinctions in other works).
19 See id. at 61-65.
20 Id. at 29.
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the threat of sanctions. Hart holds that judgments of obligation imply
beliefs about relevant standards of conduct, reasons for action, and justi-
fied criticisms of contrary behavior. MacCormick rightly emphasizes
this virtue of Hart's approach. But he appears insensitive to some very
serious difficulties within Hart's theories of obligation.
According to Hart, all obligations (or, in other words, all moral and
legal requirements) presuppose and exist by virtue of social rules.2 '
Hart explains the existence of a social rule in terms of the widespread
internalization within a community of a corresponding standard for be-
havior.2 2 The social rules imposing obligations are those backed by con-
siderable social pressure.2 3 Hart treats rules imposing moral obligations
as a species of this genus, and Hart's discussion of the differences be-
tween moral and legal obligation 24 implies that legal obligations are
likewise a species of the genus obligation and therefore that legal pri-
mary rules are a species of obligation-imposing social rules, so defined.
But Hart's theory of law and his frequent references to legal obligations,
legal primary rules, and legal obligation-imposing rules imply some-
thing different: that legal obligations are imposed by rules that exist by
virtue of their satisfying a system's criteria of validity, its tests for law.
Such rules need not reflect prevailing standards within the community
at large, and Hart does not claim that they do. For such rules to exist,
most officials must accept or internalize some criteria of legal validity.
But this does not mean that officials endorse a valid rule's standard as
such. It means only that they are committed to regarding it as having
legal standing.
The upshot is that Hart's views about legal obligation are inconsis-
tent. Legal obligation is treated as a species of obligation, and thus as the
creature of social rules, whose existence depends on general acceptance,
the widespread internalization within a community of a standard for
behavior. But it is also treated as if it weresuigeneris, the consequence of
rules that must be valid and that need not reflect a generally accepted
standard.
This sort of inconsistency can of course be exorcized from Hart's
theories by a theoretical revision. One might decide that legal "obliga-
tions" are not always genuine obligations, in which case one would cut
their ties to social rules. Or one could decide that legal requirements are
genuine obligations, and thus are on a par with moral obligations, in
which case one would revise the theory of social rules and obligations
accordingly.
Instead of pursuing these possibilities further, I suggest that the
21 See H.L.A. HART, sura note 1, at 83.
22 See id. at 54-57.
23 See id. at 84-86.
24 See id. at 163-76.
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confusion within Hart's theory is no accident, but reflects a deeper ten-
sion in his views. His discussion of the "reflective critical attitude"25
involved in judgments of obligation implies (correctly, I believe) that
they are relevant to the appraisal of behavior. To believe that someone
is under an obligation to act in a certain manner is to believe that con-
trary behavior is wrong and mayjustifiably be criticized. This requires a
qualification that Hart would no doubt accept. Because obligations are
not always absolute, can conflict with other obligations (or other consid-
erations relevant to the appraisal of behavior), and might therefore be
overridden, to believe that someone is under an obligation is to believe
that contrary behavior is wrong unless it can be justified because the
obligation is overridden. We can abbreviate this by saying (as philoso-
phers often do) that behavior contrary to an obligation is "prima facie"
wrong-so long as we remember that "prima facie" wrong does not
mean "merely appears to be wrong," but rather that there is a relevant
standard for behavior that merits respect, although it may not be
absolute.
If beliefs concerning obligations can be true, this implies that con-
trary behavior is (prima facie) wrong-that is, such behavior is wrong
unless violation of the standard can be justified. Hart's treatment of
obligation sensibly implies that beliefs about obligations can be true, for
he believes that obligations exist. Hart is not a radical skeptic about the
appraisal of behavior.
Treating legal requirements as obligations, then, implies that they
automaticaly merit such respect, that contrary behavior is (prima facie)
wrong. But why should we assume this? Legal restrictions are burden-
some and themselves require justification. It is reasonable to suppose
that some legal restrictions cannot be justified. Even if we assume that
legal restrictions that cannot be justified on their own merits deserve
some measure of respect when they are part of generally decent legal
systems, we cannot assume that systems of law are decent. A given sys-
tem, like a given rule, might or might not merit respect. This depends
upon whether it satisfies standards that are relevant to its evaluation.
Hart does not assume that legal systems automatically satisfy the
relevant conditions, and his positivism (specifically his views about "the
separation of law and morals," or, in other words, the moral fallibility of
law) does not permit such an assumption. Hart acknowledges that law
can be outrageously unjust and can become an oppressive instrument in
the hands of a dominant group.26 This implies that an entire legal sys-
tem may be so morally corrupt as not to merit any respect. In that case
(which we cannot rule out a prion), there would be no general presump-
tion that one should obey the law, and legal requirements could not
25 Id. at 55.
26 See id. at 114, 196-98.
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amount to genuine obligations. These legal requirements would not
amount to standards for behavior that merit respect, the violation of
which would be (prima facie) wrong.
This may help to explain why Hart leaves room within his theory
for a class of "legal obligations" that are sui generis. If one wishes to
apply a term like "obligation" (or any other term with similar implica-
tions for the appraisal of behavior) automatically to legal requirements, as
it is customary to do, then one must think of them as merely legal "obli-
gations," which cannot be assumed to have the normal implications of
obligations for the evaluation of behavior.
Why then does Hart not settle for this part of his theory of legal
requirements? Why does he simultaneously treat them as genuine obli-
gations, on a par with moral obligations? Part of the explanation has to
do with Hart's attitude toward law. Another part has to do with Hart's
conception of morality. Hart says, for example, in a typical pasage on
the subject, "that the certification of something as legally valid is not
conclusive of the question of obedience, and that, however great the
aura of majesty or authority which the official system may have, its de-
mands must in the end be submitted to a moral scrutiny." 27 This im-
plies that one may be justified in disobeying the law, but, more
significantly, it also implies that law automatically merits respect. Legal
requirements do not settle questions of conduct, but they are assumed
always to be relevant, even without considering whether they satisfy any
relevant standards. This assumes that legal standards are on a par with
genuine obligations, a breach of which is (prima facie) wrong.
MacCormick echoes Hart: "Law is indeed morally relevant. But it
is never, and should never be deemed, morally conclusive."'28 Such a
statement does not seem to go far enough, for it assumes that law auto-
matically merits some measure of respect, regardless of its substantive
content and its possible use as an instrument of injustice, inhumanity,
and even genocide. So it is no wonder that MacCormick should fail to
notice these tensions within Hart's theory. Both take the same funda-
mental attitude toward law. This feature of Hart's and MacCormick's
views seems to represent more than a failure of analysis. It manifests too
reverential an attitude toward law, one that fails to square with their
endorsement of "the separation of law and morals."
III
THE NATURE OF MORALITY
Hart and MacCormick not only exaggerate the moral significance
of legal requirements, but also their views about morality make it seem
as if legal and moral requirements are on a par.
27 Id. at 206.
28 N. MACCORMICK, tupra note 6, at 160; see also id. at 27.
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BOOK REVIEW
If we assume that obligations are relevant to the appraisal of behav-
ior in the way described, then we can ignore Hart's distinction between
obligation in general and moral obligation, for it has no bearing on the
problems to be discussed. Similarly, the distinction between moral obli-
gation and the more general idea of a moral requirement, which Mac-
Cormick emphasizes, will be irrelevant here, and the discussion is
simpler if we ignore it.
As previously noted, Hart holds that a belief about an obligation
implies beliefs about reasons for action and the justified criticism of be-
havior. If judgments of obligation were equivalent in content to a set of
such beliefs, then someone would be under an obligation just when the
latter set of beliefs was true-that is, when criticism of behavior contrary
to a standard that merits respect is justified.
But Hart also maintains that obligations are the products of social
rules. And he holds that such rules exist only when the corresponding
standard for behavior is widely accepted within a community. This im-
plies that someone is under an obligation to act in a certain way when-
ever enough people accept the notion that there is such an obligation-
in other words, in believing basic moral standards makes them so, pro-
vided that enough people happen to agree.
The result is an implausible conception of moral requirements. In
Hart's view, for example, if most members of a community believe that
a wife is obligated to defer to the wishes of her husband, then, regardless
of the merits of their belief, she is under that obligation and her contrary
behavior is wrong. But neither our concept of obligation nor our ordi-
nary moral judgments are tied so tightly to a social consensus, which we
recognize might be mistaken. It makes perfectly good sense for someone
to hold that she is not under an obligation, although others generally
believe that she is, or for her to hold that she is under an obligation,
even though others generally disagree. Not only does it make good
sense, but she may be right. Whether she is right depends upon the
substantive reasons for or against herjudgment. While prevailing moral
attitudes should be taken into account-for example, to avoid unneces-
sary offenses-those attitudes do not determine what reasons there are.
Hart's conception of morality is not thoroughly conventional. He
acknowledges that morality involves more than just social rules and
other shared values, such as ideals. He embraces a distinction between
"positive" (or conventional) and "critical" morality, in which the latter
refers to principles used in appraising law and social rules.2 9
This might lead one to assume that Hart qualifies the authority
that he accords to social rules when they violate minimal standards of
29 See H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 178-79. The distinction is so named in H.L.A.
HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 17-20 (1963).
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critical morality, so that indefensible rules generate no genuine obliga-
tions and do not automatically merit respect. But Hart never clearly
integrates these two aspects of his theory of morality in that way. He
never suggests that social rules that are morally indefensible are de-
prived of their moral authority, and his theory of obligation implies the
contrary. Hart treats law and morals in exactly parallel ways.
It is perhaps understandable that Hart plays down the relevance of
critical principles to the appraisal of behavior, for he never clearly em-
braces the idea that some critical principles might be sound and their
contraries unsound. Although his use of critical principles suggests such
a position, his theoretical discussions appear noncommittal on the sub-
ject. This brings us, finally, to a doctrine that both Hart and Mac-
Cormick embrace, the so-called separation of law and morals.30 In one
form or another, this doctrine is central to legal positivism.
Although he does not explicitly endorse this formulation, Hart has
given contemporary positivism a standard gloss on the separation doc-
trine: "there is no necessary connexion between law and morals, or law
as it is and law as it ought to be." 31 MacCormick plausibly interprets
this to mean that there is no "necessary conceptual link between the legal
and the moral."'32
But these formulations are unsatisfactory. They clash with Hart's
important claim that "there is, in the very notion of law consisting of
general rules, something which prevents us from treating it as if morally
it were utterly neutral, without any necessary contact with moral princi-
ples."'33 Hart argues that the idea of a general rule, which is part of the
concept of law, "connotes the principle of treating like cases alike," and
specifically suggests "justice in the administration of the law."'34 Hart
maintains the standard view that justice in the administration of the law
requires adherence to the law, however unjust its rules might be. This
helps to explain why Hart regards law as meriting respect.
Hart's reasoning is invalid and his conclusions unsound.3 5 More to
the point, Hart's argument conflicts with the separation doctrine as he
presents it and as MacCormick interprets it. If Hart is not inconsistent,
we need to understand the doctrine differently.
Positivists hold that law is a matter of social fact. This leads some
positivists who are also moral skeptics to reason in the following manner.
30 See general'y Lyons, MoralAspects of Lgal Theog, 7 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY
223 (1982).
31 H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 253; see also Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958) (defending positivism's separation of law and morals).
32 N. MACCORMICK, supra note 6, at 24 (emphasis in original).
33 Hart, supra note 31, at 624.
34 Id. at 623-24; see also H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 155-57 (expanding on the theme
that treating like cases alike is part of justice in the administration of law).
35 See Lyons, On Fomal Justice, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 833 (1973).
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Law is a matter of social fact, but morality is simply a reflection of our
arbitrary attitudes. There are legal facts and legal states of affairs, but
there are no moral facts or moral states of affairs. Essentially, what law
is cannot be determined by morality.
But this does not express the separation doctrine that most legal
positivists embraced. As Hart rightly notes, the classicial positivists,
Bentham and Austin, were by no means moral skeptics. 36 Nor does
Hart ally himself with radical skepticism about morality. Legal posi-
tivists generally take morality seriously. They regard it as important to
understand what law is so that we can evaluate law in terms of what it
ought (or ought not) to be. The separation doctrine thus addresses the
relations between law and what Hart calls "critical" morality, and it
assumes that moral criticism of the law is possible and important. As
MacCormick observes, Hart's endorsement of the separation doctrine
stems from his moral concerns. 3 7
It is tempting to understand the separation doctrine that most posi-
tivists endorse as the axiom that law is subject to moral appraisal and
does not necessarily satisfy the standards by which it may properly be
judged. This is a doctrine that radical skeptics about morality cannot
embrace. They can make no sense of the idea that there are moral stan-
dards by which law may properly be judged, because they regard moral
standards as fundamentally arbitrary.
It is unclear whether Hart can consistently endorse the separation
doctrine in such a form, for it is unclear whether he believes, along with
the classicial positivists, that certain critical principles applicable to law
are sound and their contraries unsound. Hart takes no stand on such
questions. His beliefs about moral rights and obligations, however, do
not seem consistent with the spirit of the doctrine in the form just sug-
gested. From his view, rights and obligations are determined by
whatever moral rules happen to prevail within a community, even if
those rules can not survive criticism. This suggests that the only moral
standards that Hart is prepared to regard as valid bases of moral ap-
praisal might be fundamentally arbitrary.
MacCormick's own views about morality are relevant here. He is
clearly more skeptical about morality: "Honest and reasonable people
can and do differ even upon ultimate matters of principle, each having
reasons which seem to him or her good for the view to which he or she
adheres."138 MacCormick believes that such reasons "are not in their
nature conclusive, nor equally convincing to everyone."139 From this he
infers that when there is such a disagreement, no moral position can be
36 See H.L.A. HART, sufira note 1, at 253.
37 See N. MACCORMICK, supra note 6, at 24-25.




uniquely correct. If there can be a right answer to a moral question, it
must be because there is agreement on the relevant values. As noted
earlier, MacCormick, like Hart, places great stock in moral consensus.
But, because there can be irreconcilable differences about matters
of fact, and because the reasons that can be given for judgments about
matters of fact are likewise "not in their nature conclusive, nor equally
convincing to everyone," one might expect MacCormick to be skeptical
about ordinary facts too. He suggests, however, that judgments of
value, including moral judgments, are inherently "subjective" in ways
that judgments of facts are not.4 Facts do not depend on what we
think, but the values that things have depend fundamentally on how we
happen to evaluate them. Thus, factual questions can have right an-
swers that are independent of what we think, but right answers to evalu-
ative questions exist only when people happen to agree.
This conception of morality does not square with the version of the
separation doctrine that we have been considering. That version sug-
gests that the justice or injustice, morality or immorality, of laws and
legal systems is a matter of fact that is not merely a function of moral
agreement. MacCormick can regard the morality or immorality of law
as a matter of fact, but only on the understanding that law does not
necessarily satisfy the standards that people happen to share.
Therefore MacCormick, and perhaps Hart, understand the separa-
tion doctrine somewhat differently. They hold that law is subject to
moral appraisal and does not necessarily satisfy the standards by which
it may happen to be judged. The trouble is that Hart and others defend
the separation doctrine in part by treating cases of unjust law as if the
injustice were not a function of moral agreement, but a matter of fact
determined by how people fare under such arrangements. This seems to
be misleading. It would have been helpful, therefore, if MacCormick
had addressed the issue more fully and clarified the positivistic doctrine
of "the separation of law and morals."
Hart's legal theory seems motivated by two distinct assumptions.
First, law is a matter of complex social fact that requires careful and
subtle analysis. Second, law is subject to moral appraisal. Because law
and morals share a normative vocabulary, therefore, the analysis of
moral as well as legal ideas and their differentiation is a fundamental
task of legal philosophy. Hart's work and MacCormick's study of it
combine to show that this task still lies before us.
David Lyons*
40 See id. at 105-6.
* Professor of Law and Philosophy, Cornell University.
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THE ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL BUREAU CHIEFS. Herbert
Kaufman. Washington, D.C.: Brookings. 1981. Pp. 220. $22.95 (cloth).
STALKING THE WASHINGTON BUREAUCRAT
Washington, D.C. is not only our national capitol; it is our national
curiosity. Each year tourists by the thousands flock to the city to study
the monuments and museums of the nation's capital. Not least among
the objects of curiosity is the federal government and the people who
run it. Journalists prowl the halls of government for news; lawyers and
lobbyists stalk the same halls seeking a "fair advantage"' for their cli-
ents; and academics prospect for new insights for yet another article or
book on government. In the face of such relentless searching, one might
imagine that nothing of significance could have escaped observation.
Such is the richness and variety of the subject, however, that some-
thing always seems to be left unstudied, or at least unappreciated. Her-
bert Kaufman's The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs
examines one such area. Although the bureaus and bureaucrats in gen-
eral have been studied ad nauseam, Kaufman notes that the activities of
federal bureau chiefs have not been extensively studied or fully appreci-
ated. Hence this book.
I
Kaufman does not attempt to survey all federal bureau chiefs. He
limits his survey to a sample of chiefs in six bureaus: the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (Department of Agriculture); the Cus-
toms Service (Department of the Treasury); the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (Department of Health and Human Services); the Forest
Service (Department of Agriculture); the Internal Revenue Service (De-
partment of the Treasury); and the Social Security Administration (De-
partment of Health and Human Services). It is a disparate, not to say
odd, assortment, representing a wide range of different functions and
organizational characteristics. Whether it is fairly representative of "the
bureaucracy" is another matter, on which I reserve comment until later.
Suffice it for now to note simply that the intellectual-as distinct from
mechanical-basis for the particular selection is not explained.
Kaufman's methodology is simplicity itself. He observed the chiefs
in their workday environment over approximately a year, sitting in their
I Several years ago, as a newly appointed FCC Commissioner, I was advised by Senator
Warren Magnuson, then Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee: "You will be be-
sieged by lawyers, lobbyists and others. Give them their due; all they ask of their government
is a fair advantage." No other statement so succinctly expresses the spirit with which modern
Americans petition their government.
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offices as they went about their routines, attending most of their meet-
ings, interviewing them about out-of-town trips, interviewing others
with whom they came into contact, and reviewing various documents
related to their activities. The product of this effort is not, as Kaufman
surely would agree, a scientific report. It is in fact only slightly more
than a collection of impressions, systematic after a fashion but not al-
ways purposefully focused.
Kaufman's report on his observations can be divided into roughly
two parts. The first part describes what Kaufman's bureau chiefs did,
while the second explains why what they did made relatively little dif-
ference to the performance of the agency. In the first part, Kaufman
classifies bureau-chief activities into four general categories: 2 (1) deci-
sionmaking, (2) processing information, (3) representing the bureau to
external constituents, and (4) motivating bureau personnel. His report
on these activities does not give much information about the individual
agencies or their activities. Although it is not too much to assume that
the average reader will have some general notion of the substantive busi-
ness of the agencies, Kaufman's lack of detail does not rest on this as-
sumption, but apparently on the premise that the particulars of an
agency's functions are essentially irrelevant to an appreciation of their
behavior or, at least, to an understanding of the contribution of their
chiefs. Overall, Kaufman presents only a very general summary of his
observations of all of the bureaus, with occasional references to an indi-
vidual bureau chief's activity to illustrate his points about bureau chiefs
as a group.
In Kaufman's judgment, the first bureau chief activity, decision-
making, is relatively insignificant. To those who think of the chief as the
embodiment of the agency-the "boss"-this finding may appear
counterintuitive. The relative insignificance of this function partly re-
sults from Kaufman's definition of decisionmaking as a discrete, authori-
tative choice among alternatives.a So defined, "decisions" are hard to
locate in any bureaucratic organization, for most decisions are the cul-
mination of a series of choices made at various levels of the bureaucracy.
Thus, what finally appears as an agenqy decision is the product of an
almost invisible process involving group interaction. The bureau chief's
contribution to that process more often involves one of subtle influence
on, or not so subtle direction of, subordinate staff, rather than a selection
among discrete choices.4
2 See H. KAUFMAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL BUREAU CHIEFS
17-90 (1981).
3 See id at 18-19. The definition thus excludes preparation for, and deliberation over,
alternatives. With these exclusions the wonder is not that decisionmaling accounted for little
of the chiefs' time, but that it accounted for any measurable time at all.




In contrast to the limited attention given to making "decisions," the
bureau chiefs that Kaufman observed were constantly engaged in re-
ceiving and reviewing information (fifty-five to sixty percent of their
time).5 Both the purposes ("scanning for potential embarrassment,"
"preparing for decisions," and "appraising performance") 6 and the
methods ("conferring," "reading," "direct observation") 7 of informa-
tion-gathering and evaluating are described in very general terms that
can be applied to all six bureau chiefs or, for that matter, to almost
anyone. As a consequence, we learn little of the particular problems or
issues confronted by individual bureau chiefs and how they responded
to them.
In terms of time consumed, the next most important activity for the
six bureau chiefs was the conduct of external relationships, an activity
that Kaufman estimated consumed as much as thirty percent of the bu-
reau chiefs' time.8 Not surprisingly, Congress and its staff preempted a
large share of this time. Others who were favored by the chiefs' atten-
tion included organized clientele groups, the media, other department
officials, and last and least, the general public. Kaufman's description is
once again very general, failing to offer any particular detail about ex-
They often started the process, and their interventions, even when brief, influ-
enced its course. And they frequently brought deliberations and disputes to
an end by announcing their judgment; such exercises of authority were their
distinctive contribution to the process. So their role in it was important. Nev-
ertheless, the process, once launched for a given issue, ran more or less autono-
mously to the point of resolution; subordinates did most of what was
necessary to bring it to that point.
Id at 19. One of the.disadvantages of focusing on the role of the bureau chief is that the
"autonomous" forces that take place in the bowels of the bureau are not explained. Without
more information about how the bureau operates, it is hard to appreciate the role of the chief.
5 See id at 45. See general'y id at 24-45 (discussing the reception and review of
information).
6 Id at 26-33.
7 Id at 33-44. The majority of this time was consumed by oral communications, pri-
marily through meeting with staff and others or conversing on the telephone. Kaufman does
not speculate on how this particular time allocation might affect the quality and the quantity
of information received. It would be my hunch, based in part on personal experience, that
the emphasis on oral communications-particularly by telephone--places a rather heavy
burden of reliance on what is often impressionistic, or at least unsystematic, information. If
this is true, the question of why bureaucrats devote so much time to inefficient techinques of
information-gathering naturally arises. Kaufman seems to imply that the schedule of his
chiefs left little time for reading materals other than the largelyprofoa scanning of docu-
ments requiring signature. But this suggestion merely describes the observed reality; it does
not explain it.
Bureau chiefs are not powerless to organize their schedules to suit their perceived needs.
The fact that more time is not devoted to sustained and careful reading might reflect a bu-
reaucratic habit of trying to appear to be always in motion. A person who retires to his office
for two hours to study reports will not be perceived to be as busy as one who devotes the same
time to telephone calls and meetings. It may also reflect the bureaucrat's conscious decision
not to delve deeply into a subject but rather to spend just enough time to keep the flow of
information ("throughput" in computerese) moving through the agency.
8 See id at 78. See generaly id at 45-78.
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ternal relationships, such as what particular groups were influential and
what particular committees were most active.
Finally, the bureau chiefs spent from ten to twenty percent of their
time performing what, for want of a better shorthand, I would call the
"cheerleading function"--attempting to motivate staff, increase their
sense of institutional identity, reassure them, exhort them, and so on.9
The process included such obvious techniques as giving speeches,
presenting awards, and direct consultation with subordinates. As with
the other functions, Kaufman's treatment is very general.
The outcome of all this bureaucratic activity is not easy to describe.
Indeed, Kaufman even finds it difficult to discern the contribution made
by bureau chiefs, apart from their setting a general "tone" for their or-
ganizations, 10 adding to the prestige of the bureau, and affecting the
timing and sequence of certain functions. After noting particular
achievements of a couple of the bureaus during the period of the study,
Kaufman cautions against attributing these achievements to the bureau
chiefs themselves. This is consistent with a theme running throughout
the book: that bureaucratic decisionmaking is a function of numerous
interactive processes in which the different contributions of various ac-
tors, both inside and outside of the agency, are indistinct. Indeed, to say
that the individuals' contributions are indistinct understates his point;
Kaufman appears to subscribe to the notion that organizations possess
an organic personality in which the individual actors have no important
independent identity. A flavor of this notion is captured in the follow-
ing passage:
In a sense, then, an internal dynamics seems to be at work in the
federal administrative system,. That is, at any given time, its state en-
genders behavior on the part of the people in and associated with it
that moves it almost irresistibly toward another state-not inevitably,
perhaps, but with a high degree of probability. The inner logic ap-
parently driving the system is, I admit, expressed through the actions,
and through the wills and values, of the participants. At the same
time, the actions of the participants are determined to a large degree
by what they can and cannot do in their organizational context, and
even their wills and values are shaped by the organizational situation
in which they are immersed. The two sets of factors together help
propel and steer the system. Consequently, organizations and the or-
ganizational trends and tendencies described here are not simply arti-
facts of the people who compose and nominally conduct them. They
are governed also by their own organizational imperatives.
The idea that organizations are not simply implements of human
9 Id at 78. See generaly id at 78-86.
10 See id at 139.
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intentions is consistent also with homeostatic and cybernetic models of
organization behavior. If organizations are self-regulating mecha-
nisms that tend to maintain a steady state by suppressing disturbing
factors, every proponent of change-which is to say every complainer
about the prevailing state of affairs-would encounter formidable
resistance that few could overcome. Not even those inside the organi-
zations could redirect things easily or extensively. That is exactly
what this study found."'
II
Evaluating this book is extremely difficult because its pretensions
are very modest, and one hesitates to criticize it for not doing what was
not attempted. Still, one may ask whether what was attempted was
worthwhile. My conclusion is that it probably was not. When one com-
pares Kaufman's present study to his study of Forest Service officials 2-
a classic in the genre of "sociological" observations of administrative be-
havior-the present work is particularly disappointing. It lacks the spe-
cific focus and the detail that made The Forest Ranger both interesting
and instructive. The present book offers no detail about the specific bu-
reaus, their distinctive problems, or their unique missions. The implicit
premise of Kaufman's study is that, insofar as it is pertinent to the be-
havior of the bureau chiefs, the agencies are basically the same. Given
not only the widely varying missions and histories of these different bu-
reaus, but also the disparate external environments in which each oper-
ates, that premise seems questionable. At the very least, it is a premise
that requires fuller articulation and justification, and this in turn de-
mands a more detailed explanation of the specific tasks that these bu-
reaus undertake and the specific problems that confront the bureau
chiefs. Instead, Kaufman supplies at most a handful of illustrations
about a particular problem in one of the agencies studied.
The present study also fails to offer any new theoretical insights
about bureaucracy and bureaucratic behavior. The very definition of
Kaufman's undertaking is problematic for reasons suggested earlier. His
definition of the relevant universe to be studied is an altogether confused
one, and his definition of a bureau is unsatisfactory. Admittedly, as he
observes at the outset, no standard definition of a bureau exists. 13 The
term is used indiscriminately to label offices and agencies of different
size, mission, and organizational structure. For example, the term is
used in the lexicon of federal establishments to cover organizations as
diverse as the Bureau of the Census (within the Department of Coin-
11 Id at 193-95.
12 See generalo H. KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE
BEHAVIOR (1960).
13 See H. KAUFMAN, siupra note 2, at 5-6.
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merce), the Bureau of Foods (within the Food and Drug Administration,
which is in turn within the Department of Health and Human Services),
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (within the Department of Justice),
and the Bureau of Ships (within the Department of the Navy, which is
part of the Department of Defense). On the other hand, as Kaufman's
report indicates, many "bureaus" are not labeled as such. Plainly one
cannot even rely on official labels to define the relevant universe.
The lack of a standard definition makes it important for Kaufman
to provide a clear definition of what he purports to study. Kaufman
chooses four criteria for defining the relevant universe of bureaus to be
studied:
First, they had to be departmental subdivisions closest to the secretar-
ies that were not headed by assistant secretaries or other ranks of sec-
retary. Second, they had to be line rather than staff agencies. Third,
they had to be functional, not territorial, subdivisions of the depart-
ments . . . . Fourth, at least 10 percent of their total membership
had to be serving in field stations outside the headquarters city. 14
From this universe of defined "bureaus," Kaufman selected six. The
selection is designed to offer a sampling that differed in age, size, budget,
and mission. 15 Unfortunately, Kaufman never tells us why this arbi-
trary definition of "bureau" is a relevant universe to study. What is the
significance of his four criteria? For example, why does he choose only
departmental subdivisions, as opposed to independent agencies? That
is, in what respect does an FDA bureau chief function differently from,
say, the head of the Federal Trade Commission? The significance of the
distinction between "line" and "staff" agencies is also unclear. Ac-
knowledging the distinction in terms of classic public administration
classification does not give us a clue as to why it is important in terms of
bureaucratic sociology. And why do we care about the degree of person-
nel dispersion in the agency? Except insofar as it may be a clumsy sur-
rogate for size, the relevance of this criterion is neither explained nor
self-evident. In sum, Kaufman neglects to answer the crucial question:
what will a study of these particular organizations (or their chiefs) tell us
about organizations generally, or about government bureaus in general?
The absence of an enunciated rationale for the selection of bureaus
to be studied highlights a more fundamental shortcoming of the entire
study: the absence of a clear conceptual theory of bureaucracies and
how they operate. As noted earlier, Kaufman seems to subscribe to a
model of organizational behavior that views bureaucratic actions as a
function of environmental and structural constraints, not indiviudal
utility functions. But the model is never presented in a manner that
would test its usefulness in explaining bureaucratic behavior. After all,




anything can be described as the product of "the system" if "the system"
is defined in sufficient generality.
I do not dispute Kaufman's general thesis that bureaucrats' behav-
ior is shaped by the "organizational situation in which they are im-
mersed."' 16 But Kaufman strains the point with his references to
"organizational imperatives" and "homeostatic and cybernetic models
of organization behavior," 17 phrases that almost seem to invoke Ger-
manic romantic philosophy in its reification of the collective spirit.' 8
This emphasis on the organic character of bureaucracy typifies a
sociological perspective that is strikingly different from that of econo-
mists and like-minded political scientists who focus first on the individ-
ual, deriving their theories of institutional behavior from observations of
individual motivations. 19 In contrast, Kaufman's primary focus is on
the institutional entity and its collective characteristics; the individual
and his preferences are of little or no importance in explaining the
system.
Some merit probably inheres in both the sociological and the eco-
nomic approach. For me, however, the individualistic perspective is far
more helpful in understanding the underlying causes and effects of orga-
nizational activity, as opposed to describing its superficial appearance.
The mere fact that organizational activity does not follow the interests
or desires of any one individual or group does not imply that it is en-
dowed with an autonomous will, independent of any human purposes.
It may be, as psychologists tell us, that groups sometimes behave in ways
quite alien to the desires of any of their constituent individuals. Mobs
are a classic example. But surely agencies cannot be equated with mobs.
Moreover, if we examine their activities carefully, we are certain to see
visible traces of human motivations. The individuals and their interests
are not the captives of the "organizational imperative" so much as they
are an integral part of it. To understand the situation, we need to look
more closely at the interests that interact to produce bureaucratic activ-
ity. Unfortunately, Kaufman not only fails to explore the interaction of
individual interests in his study, but he also neglects to explore the work
of bureaucratic theorists who have done so. The works of such leading
modern analysts as Downs, 20 Tullock,21 and Niskanen,22 for example,
16 Id at 194.
17 Id at 194-95.
18 Cf THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE GERMAN ROMANTICS, 1793-1815 (H. Reiss ed.
1955) (passages from Fichte, Novalis, Muller, Schliermacher, and Savigny).
19 See P. ARANSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: STRATEGY AND CHOICE 20-21 (1981),
for a vigorous defense of the individualist perspective and a criticism of the "organic fallacy."
On the difference between "sociological" and "economic" perspectives on political activity,
see B. BERRY, SOCIOLOGISTS, ECONOMISTS & DEMOCRACY ch. 8 (1978).
20 A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967).
21 G. TULLOCK, THE PoLmcs OF BUREAUCRACY (1965).




Apart from exploring general theories of bureaucratic behavior,
Kaufman might have undertaken many other useful inquiries that
would have related his empirical observations to more general observa-
tions about organizational behavior in particular situations. For exam-
ple, Kaufman tells us that processing information is the most time
consuming and, he implies, the most important activity of the bureau
chiefs. In itself, this is not a very startling or important finding. What
one wants to know is how the chiefs process information, for what pur-
poses, and with what kinds of difficulties. Yet Kaufman provides no
details sufficient to evaluate the purposes or the processes of information
gathering and evaluation. He also makes no effort to relate these inquir-
ies to general models of bureaucratic behavior.
One example of the inadequacy of Kaufman's analysis is his discus-
sion of the purposes behind information processing. Kaufman notes that
"scanning for potential embarrassment" is a major objective of bureau
chiefs in seeking information. His observation seems to invite further
speculation on how this objective influences bureaucratic decisions. It
does not come as a surprise that bureaucrats, like most persons, are sen-
sitive to possible embarrassment. Nor is it to be regretted that they are,
for such sensitivity can be an important element in making bureaucrats
socially responsible. On the other hand, too great a sensitivity may in-
duce a degree of risk aversion that is harmful to the public interest.
There has been speculation that just such risk aversion underlies some
regulatory attitudes. The FDA's alleged conservatism in licensing new
drugs is a commonly cited example.2 3 That the FDA is one of the bu-
reaus Kaufman studies makes all the more noticeable his failure to
probe into the relationship between the type of information bureau
chiefs seek and the decisions that they make.
As to processes, it is now fairly conventional learning that informa-
tion is subject to distortion in rough proportion to the number of filters
23 See P. ARANSON, Supra note 19, at 472-74. This particular criticism is not that agen-
cies are risk-averse with regard to all errors, but merely concerning those that are detectable.
The criticism is a logical extension of the argument that bureaus and bureaucrats seek to
maximize bureau outputs that are monitorable and measurable. See Lindsay, A Theoy of
Government Enterprise, 84 J. POL. EcON. 1073 (1976). A difficulty with this argument, and its
extension, is that of identifying who precisely are the monitors. In the case of the FDA, for
example, the argument assumes that the error-costs of preventing or delaying the marketing
of a safe and effective drug (a so-called false negative or type II error) are less detectable than
those of permitting the marketing of an unsafe or ineffective drug ("a false positive" or "type
I" errors). But detectable by whom? The general public might detect the type II error less
readily than the type I error, but industry might detect it more readily. The question then
becomes whose reaction is more crucial to the agency. This, in turn, may depend on Con-
gress's responsiveness to the different perceptions of industry and the public. Notice that the
assumption that the FDA is averse to errors detectable by the public conflicts with the claim
of some observers that the FDA is closely responsive to the drug industry. Se R. NOLL,
REFORMING REGULATIONS 52-53 (1971).
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through which it must pass en route to the ultimate decisionmaker.2 4 At
each level of the bureau, we can expect not only some unintended loss of
relevant information, but also some staff manipulation that will cause
the information to appear in a light most favorable to the interests of the
staff members involved. Kaufman's study might have offered an excel-
lent opportunity to explore empirically the intricacies of such distortion,
its significance for decisionmaking, and the methods that bureau chiefs
employ to correct it. Although Kaufman recognizes the distortion prob-
lem in general terms, he made little effort, if any, to investigate it. His
"findings" on this point are a few summary generalizations to the effect
that the problem of staff distortion was "not very great in practice. '25
His observations are-too general to be instructive about the nature of the
problem or its supposed correction. One would welcome some detail for
illustrative purposes at least. For example, I would like some informa-
tion about the nature of the different perceptions within the bureau's
staff, and how these differences relate to their respective functions.2 6 We
could also be told a great deal more about how the bureau's external
relations correct staff distortion, and what kinds of new distortions these
relations introduce.
External relations suggest another important area of bureaucratic
activity that Kaufman touches on but does not critically analyze. One
of the bureau chiefs' most important activities is dealing with external
constituents-most notably, Congress and representatives of organized
clientele groups. Apart from telling us that this is an important activity,
however, Kaufman does not give us a very sharp picture of the nature of
these relationships or their effect on bureaucratic behavior and agency
performance. Consider, for example, his report on congressional rela-
tions. We are told that both appropriations and legislative subcommit-
tees conducted "searching inquiries," 27 but we are given almost no
information about what they searched for, what they received, and with
what effect.
Here again the absence of a reference to general theories of political
24 See, e.g., A. DOWNS, supra note 20, at ch. 10.
25 H. KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 38.
26 We can realistically suppose that a bureaucrat's perceptions, like those of "ordinary"
people, are influenced by his role within the agency and his external constituency. Thus, we
should not be surprised if the bureau responsible for overseeing the activities of one industry
should perceive a problem in that industry differently from how another bureau not having
such responsibility would perceive it. This phenomenon is not necessarily confined to bureau
staffs associated with different industries. Staffs with different professional orientations will
betray characteristically different biases. For an excellent illustration, see B. ACKERMAN &
W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 79-86 (1981). One would expect the effect of these
biases to be enhanced to the extent of conflicts between staff overjurisdictional prerogatives-
what Downs calls "policy space." A. DOwNS, supra note 20, at 212. Kaufman's book gives no
attention to these particular sources of information distortion and conflict or to how the chiefs
attempted to correct them.
27 H. KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 27.
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behavior is regrettable. The interrelationship of Congress and the bu-
reaucracy has been the subject of considerable theorizing as well as em-
pirical observation. 28 Kaufman's study could have provided an
excellent occasion for comparing observations on this relationship. For
example, one school of thought perceives the relationship between con-
gressmen and bureaucrats as a competitive struggle for control of public
policy. 29 Another sees the relationship as an essentially symbiotic one in
which bureaucrats supply congressmen with various political benefits in
return for bureaucratic perquisites.30 It would be interesting to know
whether Kaufman's observations could corroborate or contradict these
theories. Unfortunately, if he obtained any information relevant to such
speculations, he does not report it.
Kaufman's treatment of the bureaus' relationships with interest
groups represents another lost opportunity. The book contains no eval-
uation of the nature of these relationships. We are given an illustrative
list of organized groups with whom some of the bureau chiefs dealt.
The list for the head of the Forest Service includes: "professional forest-
ers. . . wood-producing and wood-using industries and workers in those
industries, developers of mineral and gas and oil resources, grazing inter-
ests, wildlife biologists and enthusiasts. . . recreation consumers...-a3
What are we to make of such a list? Surely Kaufman does not want us
to believe that these groups are all equally influential on matters of for-
est-management policy or that their relationships with the agency in
general or the chief in particular are the same. It is disappointing that
28 See, e.g., M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT
(1977); L. FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE
(1981); Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theoy of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
1 (1982).
29 By one account, the bureaucrats have usually come out ahead by seizing legislative
initiative or at least expanding legislative delegations beyond the limits that Congress demar-
cated. See, e.g., Wiltse, The Representative Function of Bureaucracy, 35 AM. POL. SOI. REv. 510,
515 (1941). Needless to say, this view is a popular ingredient of congressional rhetoric on the
subject. The evidence is, however, ambiguous at best: some observers find evidence of con-
gressional dominance. See, e.g., Weingast & Moran, The Myth ofRunaway Bureaucacy-The Case
ofthe FTC, 6 REG. 33 (1982). Kaufman obviously subscribes to the congressional-dominance
view, see H. KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 164-66, but he offers no specific evidence in support of
this view other than the fact that congressional committees are very active in oversight hear-
ings and related inquiries. See id at 48-54. Effort, however, does not equal effect-indeed, it
is possible that the effort that Kaufman sees is more for show than effect. The real efforts are
likely to be the product of more subtle techniques of influence than are evidenced by formal
congressional oversight hearings.
The ambiguity of the evidence as to who comes out ahead is due in part to the fact that
the "struggle" between bureaucratic and congressional protagonists often turns out to be the-
atrical rather than real, a pretense that masks the positive-sum character of the game.
30 See, e.g., M. FIORINA, supra note 28; Weingast, Regulations, Reregulation and Deregulation."
The Political Foundations of Agency Clientele Relationships, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147
(1981).
31 H. KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 70.
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Kaufman does not provide more information about the nature of these
relationships based on his personal observations.
One of the timeless criticisms of agencies is that they are captured
by private interest groups whose affairs they are supposed to oversee.32
The sharp edge of this criticism has been dulled by indiscriminate use;
no careful student of administrative behavior today would embrace this
cliche without significant qualifications as to its applicability.33 Still,
the claim has enough substance to warrant some inquiry by Kaufman
into its possible relevance to selected bureau chiefs. Is the Forest Service
and, by implication, its Chief, the "captive" of the timber industry as
Justice Douglas once asserted?3 4 Among his multiple constituents, to
whom does Smokey the Bear listen most attentively? Given the conflicts
among competing interest groups, how is the Chief likely to respond to
different signals? Is there a strategy for playing these interest groups off
against each other?
I make the foregoing criticisms with some reluctance, mindful of
the point made earlier that one should not criticize an author for failing
to achieve what he did not attempt. In particular, my comments about
the absence of any new theoretical insights may be somewhat misdi-
rected because Kaufman evidently did not set out to develop or test any
theory of bureaucratic behavior. Still, the fact that Kaufman makes no
attempt to relate his study to other studies of bureaucracy in order to
derive some general lessons about bureaucratic behavior at least raises a
question as to the purpose of his undertaking. Because Kaufman does
not purport to tell us anything about the substantive work of the six
bureaus, we must judge his work on what it informs us about concerning
bureaucracies and bureaucrats or, at least, bureau chiefs.
On that score I would conclude that the book's contribution to our
understanding is very modest. Reduced to its most elemental terms, the
upshot of the book seems to be that bureau chiefs are very busy folks,
they do a lot of paper shuffling and talking, and sometimes they contrib-
ute to the overall "tone" of an agency, but beyond that they do not play
a particularly critical role in the overall bureaucratic scheme of things.
Armed with this information, we presumably will be very careful about
attributing any great importance to bureau chiefs in the future. Assum-
32 The assertion is most often made of regulatory agencies, see, e.g., R. NOLL, supra note
23, at 99-100, but it is not limited to them, see P. ARANSON, supra note 19, at 485-86.
33 See, e.g., P. ARANSON,supra note 19; J. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 372-
75 (1980). Among the more important qualifications is the fact that the capture thesis naively
implies a process by which legislative programs, passed in the "public interest," are corrupted
when the agencies that administer them are taken over by narrow interest groups (industry in
particular). In reality, however, the "takeover" all too often occurs in the legislative process
itself, in which event the assumption of a legislative "public interest" objective is problemati-
cal. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 28; Stigler, The TheoV7 of Economic Regula-
tion, 2 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
34 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 748 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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ing that Kaufman's conclusion is true-and within the framework of
this book it is very difficult to tell whether it is or not-such information
is not altogether useless. But those who are truly curious about the folk-
ways of Washington bureaucrats should search elsewhere to satisfy their
curiosity.
Glen 0. Robinson*
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
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MARXISM AND LAW. Hugh Collins. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1982
Pp. viii, 159. £8.95 (cloth).
MARXISM AS METAPHOR
A Marxist analysis of law claims that a reasonably systematic rela-
tion exists between the law and the relations of production, with the
latter more or less determining the former. Such an analysis faces three
linked difficulties, which I will call the problem of mechanism, the prob-
lem of law as constitutive, and the problem of reification.
The problem of mechanism is the one that most non-Marxists latch
onto most easily. They say that a Marxist analysis must claim that in a
capitalist society law serves the interests of the ruling class. Yet we all
know that judges are formally independent of class pressures, that they
only occasionally say that they are acting to promote class interests, and
that their social ties to the ruling class are loose enough to make it im-
plausible that the judges are instruments of the ruling class. If all this is
so, the non-Marxist asks, how then does the coincidence between law
and ruling class interests come about?
The problem of law as constitutive mainly arises within the Marxist
camp. In its simplest version, the problem arises because class relations
are defined in terms of which class owns the means of production, and,
yet, ownership is a legal category that takes on its meaning only because
of its relation to all other available legal categories. Law thus seems to
define or constitute class relations, in which case it is circular to say that
the relations of production somewhat determine the law. How then is a
Marxist analysis of law possible?
The problem of reification is the peculiar American contribution to
the discussion, because of the strong influence of legal realism on Ameri-
can thought about law.1 One might say, using the scientific terminology
to which some Marxists are attracted, that we must specify carefully the
dependent variable--"law"--in the analysis. Most Marxists seem to
want to say that a rule of law-the fellow-servant rule is a classic exam-
ple--serves class interests. Yet the legal realists taught us that there
never was a "fellow-servant rule" that could be a dependent variable to
be explained in terms of its links to the economic base. There were and
always are rules and counterrules, rules with exceptions of such scope as
to threaten the rule itself, rules whose force can be eliminated by draw-
ing creatively on analogies to apparently unrelated areas of law, and so
on. Statutes too have to be interpreted and fit into a whole legal uni-
1 Similar effects on general discussions have been caused by American political science.
For a summary of contemporary Marxist theories of the state that demonstrates that influ-
ence, see B. J.ssoP, THE CAPITALIST STATE (1982).
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verse, and cannot be understood as a series of words whose meaning is
fixed at the time of enactment. What then can a Marxist analysis try to
analyze?
Hugh Collins's superb book, Marxism and Law, is a sympathetic ex-
plication of what a sensible Marxist analysis might be. It confronts di-
rectly the problems of mechanism and of law as constitutive, and gives
answers that seem satisfactory on Collins's level of discussion although
the answers weaken the claim that Marxists have a special way of ana-
lyzing the law. Collins repeatedly notices the problem of reification but
does not offer an answer. Indeed, he seems to view reification as inher-
ent in the Marxist program 2 and criticizes efforts to avoid reification as
inconsistent with Marxism. 3 He may be correct, in the sense that avoid-
ing reification may, but only may, deprive the analysis of any specifi-
cally Marxist content.
I
THE PROBLEM OF MECHANISM
After an introductory chapter explaining why Marxists reject "legal
fetishism"-the view that the law is "an essential component of social
order" 4 -and seek an image of reality undistorted by that view, Collins
discusses the fundamental Marxist argument that law is "essentially
superstructural, dependent for [its] form and content upon determining
forces emanating from the economic basis of society." 5 He rejects the
theory, which he calls class instrumentalism, that law directly reflects
the interests of the ruling class. While such a theory may have some-
thing to say about the laws regulating the relations of production, it is
totally implausible as an explanation of such things as the details of
family law.6 According to Collins, class instrumentalism fails on three
grounds: it is "often. . .impossible" to link a legal rule to "any aspect
of the relations of production"; some laws are "deliberate attempt[s] to
change . . .minor aspect[s] of the relations of production" and there-.
fore cannot reflect them; and, most important, there is no "account of
how conscious action is determined by the material basis."'7
This last ground is the problem of mechanism. One mechanism is
conscious awareness of class interests. The law would reflect the inter-
ests of the ruling class if lawmakers knew their class interests and en-
acted them into law. Collins agrees that, just as class instrumentalism
may account for some aspects of the law, conscious choice may be the
2 See, e.g., H. COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAw 75-76, 84 (1982).
3 See, e.g., id at 99-100, 109.
4 Id at 10.
5 Id at 22.
6 Id at 23-25.
7 Id at 25.
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mechanism linking law and class interests in some cases. He argues,
however, that lawmakers may not always, perhaps never, know what
constitutes the long-term interests of the ruling class. 8 An alternative
theory, which allows subjective perceptions to diverge from objective
class interests, leaves law as "a loose collection of rules produced by the
fluctuating forces of diverse political groups" within the ruling class,
whose diversity rests not on differences in interests but only on differ-
ences in perception. 9 Collins concludes that conscious awareness is a
logically unsatisfactory answer to the problem of mechanism: "[E]ither
there has to be an account of how motivations inevitably coincide with a
person's objective class position, or it has to be explained how the social
class . . . comes to share a common perception of interests."' 1
This gap of logic is filled by a theory of ideology, which not only
strengthens the "conscious awareness" answer, but provides an alterna-
tive answer to the problem of mechanism. For Collins, ideology is
formed by a process of socialization in which people acquire a "set of
signs and categories" with which they "interpret the world."" Ideology
is the way that people make sense of their experiences, and the means by
which experiences that are painful and unsettling become natural. The
pain of alienation is transmitted into the resigned or joyous acceptance
of "the naturalness of an individualistic market economy."' 12 Law plays
an important ideological role because it is "encountered frequently in
daily life" and "provides a comprehensive interpretation and evaluation
of social relationships and events which is in tune with the main themes
in the dominant ideology."' 13
Collins is of course aware that "in tune with" is a long way from "is
determined by." The difficulty is that the dominant ideology is so open
that almost anything can be "in tune with" it. Collins argues that
Marxists can respond to the openness of ideology in one of two ways.
They can "limit the[ir] claims. . . to manageable proportions" and ar-
gue that they will explain only "the broad outlines of social evolu-
tion."'14 This solution, Collins correctly states, is "unpalatable" to many
Marxists because it means that their theory will have nothing to say
about the class struggles that they see "all around them."'15
The alternative is to emphasize the "plasticity and omnipresence of
the dominant ideology." 16 Through this emphasis Marxists are able to
8 Steid at31.
9 Id at 31-32.
10 Id at 32.
11 Id at 38-39.
12 Id at 42.
13 Id at 50.
14 Id at 56.




make some sense of the experience of analysts of law-that things hap-
pen, decisions are made, laws are enacted which seem to be the product
of guild interests on the part of lawyers or which seem to have little
connection to the relations of production. The vehicle in Marxist theory
for this sense is the concept of relative autonomy. 17 Collins struggles
hard to make sense of this concept as a tool of Marxist analysis, conclud-
ing that in its best form, "relative autonomy" means that "the dominant
ideology produces. . . the underlying categories and values of the legal
system, but through a logical process judges articulate the precise impli-
cations of these forms."' 8 Yet, Collins points out, this formulation
threatens "any illuminating materialist explanation of the content of
law."' 9 If judges have an autonomous power to manipulate underlying
categories, what prevents them from doing so in ways that "[alter] the
basic principles through legal reasoning"? 20 Collins summarizes:
If [Marxists] stick to a purely instrumental explanation of legal
reasoning,. . . then the whole enterprise of ensuring coherence and
consistency in legal reasoning has to be dismissed as false conscious-
ness, perpetuated by lawyers who are concerned to mystify their desire
to support the interests of the ruling class. On the other hand, an
acceptance of the autonomy thesis poses a threat to the whole theory
of historical materialism. 21
Marxists, it would seem, have a choice between presenting a false pic-
ture of reality or being un-Marxist.
Collins suggests that, once again, ideology offers the way out. The
apparent autonomy of legal reasoning is an ideology that makes sense of
the experience of openness and flexibility within the legal system:
"Lawyers are concerned with coherence and consistency because they
are attempting to resolve conflicting interpretations of the dominant
ideology,"'22 which is itself open and flexible. But now Collins closes the
trap. Because of the plasticity of the dominant ideology, "it is possible
to eliminate any counter-examples without difficulty. ' 23 On a Popper-
ian view of science, which I take it many Marxists hold, this makes the
Marxist analysis of law unscientific. Collins concludes that instrumen-
talism must be rejected because it is "unfaithful to the Marxist explana-
tion of ideologies,"' 24 but that an ideological explanation that
emphasizes "the plasticity of the dominant ideology"25 must also fail
17 Id at 61-74.
18 Id at 68.
19 Id at 69.
20 Id at 68.
21 Id at 70.
22 Id at 73.
23 Id at 75.
24 Id
25 Id at 76.
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because it cannot connect the relations of production to the content of
law.
Notice, however, that Collins appears to require that a Marxist
analysis of law provide an explanation of the content of the law. As I
have suggested, Collins discusses plastic ideologies because he wants to
avoid the "unpalatable" limitation of Marxist analysis to broad histori-
cal developments. Similarly, he concludes his discussion of ideology by
acknowledging that this criticism loses force if we are willing to limit the
scope of the theory and thereby leave "large gaps in the account of
laws." 26 I will argue below that such a limitation is necessary, not to
preserve the distinctively Marxist elements of the analysis, but to make
it minimally coherent. The problem of reification is another version of
the question of scope to which Collins attends. Solving it may rescue the
Marxist project, although perhaps at a cost unacceptable to many
Marxists.
II
THE PROBLEM OF LAW AS CONSTITUTIVE
How can one simultaneously believe all of the following proposi-
tions to be true: (1) The base determines (in some strong or weak sense)
the superstructure; (2) law is an element of the superstructure; (3) the
base consists of the relations of production; and (4) relations of produc-
tion are defined in terms of ownership of the means of production? Le-
gal terms seem to constitute the base, but that is what supposedly
determines them.
Collins's chapter on this issue 27 focuses as it must on G. A. Cohen's
masterly contribution. 28 Cohen argues that we must define "relations of
production" in terms of physical power over the means of production.
This may not work, Cohen concedes, when a mode of production has
matured and physical power has acquired normative value by its recog-
nition in law. But "in a period of transformation," 29 we can see how
physical power and legally recognized ownership do not coincide. Col-
lins objects, cogently I believe, that somehow during such periods power
and ownership have to be brought into harmony.30 Drawing on his ear-
lier analysis, Collins argues, that ideology provides the mechanism by
which this harmonization occurs.3 ' But if that is so, Cohen can no
longer hinge his solution to the problem of law as constitutive to "peri-
ods of transformation." Ideologies are groups of ideas that take a long
26 Id
27 See generally id 77-93.
28 G. COHEN, KARL MARX' THEORY OF HISTORY (1978).
29 H. COLLINS, supra note 2, at 82.
30 See id at 84.
31 See id at 84-85.
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time to develop and acquire normative and persuasive content through
sustained struggle between those favored by existing ideologies and
those seeking to institute new ones:
A dominant ideology with the potential to shape a social formation
could only arise from settled social practices where norms of beha-
viour had established a degree of regularity of behaviour within which
persistent conceptions of the world could emerge. This ideology could
not arise from the kind of transitory power relations by which Cohen
characterizes the material base.32
This analysis of Cohen's thesis seems correct to me. Collins proceeds
to offer a different solution to the problem, a solution that resembles the
legal anthropologists' notion of law as a double institutionalization of
regularities in behavior into social norms and then into enforceable
rules.33 Collins argues that as a mode of production develops (in the
womb of an earlier one, Marx might have said), segments of the commu-
nity (nascent class fragments, Poulantzas might have said)3 4 interact in
patterned ways that rest on their relations to the means of production.
Because people need ways of thinking that make sense of their lives, they
begin to treat these patterns as norms. When the new mode of produc-
tion replaces the old, these norms are converted into legal rules.35 Thus
the legal rules come to constitute the base by a process of social develop-
ment and class struggle, through the struggle for ideological domination
in the preceding period.
The argument works neatly up to this point. When it is combined
with Collins's earlier arguments about the plasticity of a dominant ide-
ology, however, it devastates his effort to make sense of a Marxist analy-
sis of law that does not have "large gaps in the account of laws." To
demonstrate this, I must depart from the close tracking that I have given
of Collins's arguments and jump to his final chapter.
In that chapter, Collins "turn[s]. . . from theory to practice" 36 and
asks how a Marxist might use law in the class struggle. "The radical's
predicament"37 is that the tactical use of law for short-term ends may
validate the ideal with law within bourgeois society, enhance the ideo-
logical underpinnings of class rule, and thus impede rather than pro-
mote revolutionary change in the long run.38 This occurs because the
capitalist mode of production supports, and requires, only a neutral
32 Id at 85.
33 See, e.g., Bohannan, The Difltring Realms of the Law, in LAW AND WARFARE 45-50 (P.
Bohannan ed. 1967).
34 See N. POuLANTZAs, POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL CLASSES 77-84 (1973).
35 H. COLLINS, supra note 2, at 88-89.
36 Id at 124.
37 Id
38 Id at 126-27.
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state to protect property and enforce contracts.39 According to Collins,
"[w]hat is needed is a programme for the demystification of the neutral-
ity of the liberal political order, and its replacement by an appreciation
of the class structure of government." 4° Such a program must be prag-
matic, sometimes using law to "heighte[n] . . . class-consciousness" by
securing laws that "increase the opportunities for a working-class move-
ment to gain cohesion," 4' sometimes foregoing apparent reforms as in-
sufficiently demystifying.
I have my doubts about the efficacy of a tactical use of law, which
the ruling class may readily describe as a cynical manipulation of the
uncohesive working class, thereby preventing an increase in cohesion.
But suppose that we treat Collins's statements not as a political program
for Marxists, but as the basis for analyzing the specific content of law in
capitalist society. Given that class struggle for Marxists is endemic al-
though not always self-conscious, and given a relatively open ideology of
the sort that Collins describes, the laws as they are at any moment must
be seen as the product of the class struggle at that moment. Reforms are
extracted from unwilling segments of the ruling class by pressure from
the working class, enhanced by those leading segments of the bourgeoi-
sie that understand how reform may preserve capitalism. Conversely,
repressive laws are imposed by the ruling class on a working class too
weak to resist.42 Now consider Collins's solution to the problem of law
as constitutive: Regularities of behavior are also negotiated through the
class struggle, the particular social norms that embody those regularities
ratify the outcome of the class struggle, and the laws that come to consti-
tute the base institutionalize the success of the ruling class. In sum, Col-
lins says that Marxists may escape the circularity of law as constitutive
only by developing an empty analytic theory that states no more than
that particular laws are explained by the state of the class struggle.
Marxists, therefore, must relinquish the project of developing a reason-
ably comprehensive Marxist analysis of law.
III
THE PROBLEM OF REIFICATION
I have argued that in dealing with the first two problems of mecha-
nism and law as constitutive, Collins leaves Marxism with a serious
problem concerning the proper scope of its analysis of law. He argues
that a reasonably comprehensive theory will be empty insofar as it em-
phasizes the plasticity of ideology and, I have suggested, thus argues in
39 Id at 131.
40 Id at 141.
41 Id at 142.
42 Presumably almost all of this occurs through the operations of the ideological mecha-
nism that Collins has identified.
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effect that Marxism has an empty theory of how the base is constituted
by law. It may be possible, however, to have a Marxist analysis of law
that makes less comprehensive claims than Collins requires of the analy-
sis that he elucidates.
In a chapter entitled "The Prognosis for Law,"' 43 Collins touches on
this possibility of a more limited Marxist analysis. His discussion is
shaped by the utopian vision of a communist society in which the state,
and presumably the law as well, will have withered away. I must con-
fess that when the issue is phrased in that way, it strikes me that the
ensuing discussion is likely to be highly idealist and unilluminating, al-
though it must be noted that the "wrong" answer cost Evgeny
Pashukanis, the leading Soviet philosopher of the law in the 1920s, his
life during the terror of the 1930s. Pashukanis developed the "commod-
ity-exchange theory" of law.44 According to this theory, Marx discov-
ered how the fetishism of commodities worked by presenting to everyone
in bourgeois society the image of commodities stripped of the labor
(power) that produces them. Commodity fetishism lets us treat as fungi-
ble all the diverse products of diverse human labor by reducing them to
a common unit of labor power. But commodities cannot be exchanged
in the market without some human participation, making it necessary to
supplement the economic relationship among commodities with a legal
relationship among people. This legal relationship corresponds to, and
in some versions is derived from, the reduction of diverse human labor
to a uniform unit of labor power. For in the legal sphere, law reduces all
the diverse relations of social life to relations among legally indistin-
guishable individuals. Thus, what links law to the material base is the
parallel between the way commodities present themselves to us and the
way that we conceive of our relations to each other.45 In the currently
fashionable terminology, the commodity-exchange theory of law would
have Marxism explain the form of law but not its content.
The commodity-exchange theory avoids one version of the problem
of reification. In my discussion so far, I have been careful to talk of law
in a relatively undifferentiated way. The problem of reification arises
when one tries to analyze specific rules or doctrines and link them to the
material base, which is the comprehensive project that Collins attributes
to Marxism. The difficulty is that, as the realists taught us, there are no
specific rules or doctrines. There are results in particular cases, which
the judges rationalize by invoking or creating a rule. But there are al-
ways alternative rules that could have been invoked to yield a different
result, and alternative rationalizations of the same result that invoke still
43 H. COLLINS, sufira note 2, at 94-123.
44 Id at 108-11.
45 For a presentation of the commodity-exchange theory as applied to the state as a
whole, see B. Jassop, supa note 1, at 78-141.
[Vol. 68:281
BOOK REVIEW
other rules. One does not have to believe as I do that this indeterminacy
is total to understand that indeterminacy of any significant degree will
doom the comprehensive project. Not only will it be clear that the re-
sult could have been different, so that the link between the rule invoked
and the material base will be entirely adventitious, but the rule itself
could have been different, so that the link that is supposed to explain
things would have to be reconstructed entirely ad hoc.
Collins criticizes Pashukanis for trying "to explain all legal rules as
reflections of commodity exchange."'46 The realist argument shows that
such an effort cannot -succeed. The commodity-exchange theory, how-
ever, need not involve that effort.47 Instead, it could try to explain only
the general form of legal relationships in bourgeois society. Another ver-
sion of the problem of reification, however, then arises. As Collins states
the matter: "Bourgeois legal systems are described as sets of general,
abstract rules of universal application. . . . I doubt whether. . . this is
a fair description of many parts of modern legal systems. . . .-48 He
notes that in many fields, especially those involving the regulatory-state
characteristic of contemporary capitalism, "the overwhelming charac-
teristic of the regulations seems to be their attention to minute detail
rather than abstract principle. '49
One could discount this observation, as Claus Offe does, by treating
the detail of regulatory laws as a contradiction within later-developed
capitalist laws, which has been generated in turn by the contradictions
of capitalism.50 A realist would say, however, that generality and ab-
straction are themselves always masks for minutely particularized deci-
sions. The stated rules, when seen as the realist insists that they must be
seen in the precise contexts in which they are applied, are what philoso-
phers might call definite descriptions. This, however, makes the com-
modity-exchange theory all the more interesting, because it attempts to
explain why the appeal to generality and abstraction is so potent that
legal decisionmakers always try to use it, are embarrassed when they are
forced to particularize, see minutely detailed regulations as a threat to
the rule of law, and reject the realist argument fairly violently. Collins
criticizes the theory, but only insofar as it tries to be comprehensive.
Collins has shown that the only candidate for a viable Marxist the-
46 See H. COLLINS, supra note 2, at 109.
47 I know too little about Pashukanis to say whether Collins is right about him. His
work, Law and Marxiwz, suggests to me that Collins has overstated the extent to which
Pashukanis was committed to a comprehensive theory. See E. PASHUKANIS, LAW AND MARX-
ISM (P. Beime & R. Sharlet eds. 1981).
48 H. COLLINS, supra note 2, at 99-100.
49 Id at 100.
50 See, e.g., Offe & Ronge, Theses on the Thoo, of the State, 6 NEw GERMAN CRMQUE 137
(1975); Offe, Stnwtural Problems of the Capitalist State, 1 GERMAN PoLrrcAL STUDIES 31 (K
Von Beyme ed. 1974).
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ory is one that deals with the form and not the content of the law. The
commodity-exchange theory is the leading, perhaps the only, contender
of that sort. Collins, however, has not shown that, like the other theo-
ries, it will not work.
CONCLUSION
A Marxist theory of the legal form may be impossible. One might
construct a theoretical entity labeled "the legal form," but that entity
never appears in any real bourgeois society. Instead, as Collins's exam-
ple of regulatory law indicates, all real societies are not pure versions of
a mode of production and what it may entail, but social formations in
which elements of various modes of production coexist. To analyze soci-
eties using abstract categories may be possible, but only because one
makes some obviously problematic epistemological assumptions. Con-
temporary Marxists are in general committed to those assumptions.5'
Every instinct I have tells me that they are wrong, but I am not quali-
fied to reject those assumptions out of hand.
Yet even if the epistemological assumptions are wrong, and even if
a Marxist analysis of law of the sort that I have discussed is impossible,
something still remains to be said. In one sense Marxism is the only
remaining secular view that is committed to fighting domination wher-
ever it occurs. Considered in that light, the debate over the withering
away of law takes on a new aspect. Law may be taken as a metaphor for
all those facets of our social relationships that seem to us necessary for us
to get along in the world and that also seem somehow imposed on us.
Marxism is then a metaphor for a world of radical contingency, in
which we know that social regularities are constructed by our own ac-
tions, have no life of their own, and may be challenged and recon-
structed whenever and however we want. In that world, however, what
do we do about the Charles Mansons and David Rockefellers?
Mark V Tushnet*
51 B. JEssoP, supra note 1, makes this commitment clear, and Jessop himself is commit-
ted to these assumptions.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University.
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